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ABSTRACT
We are interested in the security of the MPLS Transport Profile
(MPLS-TP), in the context of smart-grid communication networks.
The security guidelines of the MPLS-TP standards are written in a
complex and indirect way, which led us to pose as hypothesis that
vendor solutions might not implement them satisfactorily. To test
this hypothesis, we investigated the Cisco implementation of two
MPLS-TP OAM (Operations, Administration, and Maintenance)
protocols: bidirectional forwarding detection (BFD), used to detect
failures in label-switched paths (LSPs) and protection state coor-
dination (PSC), used to coordinate protection switching. Critical
smart grid applications, such as protection and control, rely on the
protection switching feature controlled by BFD and PSC. We did
find security issues with this implementation. We implemented a
testbed with eight nodes that run the MPLS-TP enabled Cisco IOS;
we demonstrated that an attacker who has access to only one cable
(for two attacks) or two cables (for one attack) is able to harm the
network at several points (e.g., disabling both working and protec-
tion LSPs). This occurred in spite of us implementing the security
guidelines that are available from Cisco for IOS and MPLS-TP. The
attacks use forged BFD or PSC messages, which induce a label-
edge router (LER) into believing false information about an LSP. In
one attack, the LER disables the operational LSP; in another attack,
the LER continues to believe that a physically destroyed LSP is up
and running; in yet another attack, both operational and backup
LSPs are brought down. Our findings suggest that the MPLS-TP
standard should be more explicit when it comes to security. For ex-
ample, to thwart the attacks revealed here, it should mandate either
hop by hop authentication (such as MACSec) at every node, or an
ad-hoc authentication mechanism for BFD and PSC.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
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1. INTRODUCTION
The MPLS Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) is one of the proposed
communication technologies for smart-grid networks [6]. MPLS-
TP is mainly used for long-distance inter-control center communi-
cation of measurement data (e.g, synchrophasor data from Phasor
Measurement Units), and control and protection commands. Given
the critical nature of these type of communications for the reliable
operation of a smart grid, the communication infrastructure is re-
quired to satisfy high availability with bounded delay. MPLS-TP
satisfies these requirements in that it supports traffic engineering to
guarantee deterministic delay for high priority traffic, and it pro-
vides end-to-end protection - ensuring network reliability and high
availability. End-to-end protection is achieved by the MPLS-TP
OAM (Operations, Administration and Maintenance) framework
that provides protection switching feature, controlled by bidirec-
tional forwarding detection (BFD) and protection state coordina-
tion (PSC) protocols. BFD detects failures in label-switched paths
(LSP), and PSC coordinates the protection switching.
The fact that an MPLS-TP network extends over a (usually un-
protected) wide area renders the communication network vulnera-
ble to cyber intrusions by an attacker with a malicious intention of
compromising the smart grid’s operations. Hence, one of the ma-
jor challenges for a smart grid utility is to implement proper cyber
security protection methods for its MPLS-TP based WAN.
There is a whole family of MPLS-TP-related RFCs [7, 8, 12, 15,
16] and several among them are security-related. However, we find
that the RFC-based security analysis of MPLS-TP is complex due
to fragmentation of pieces of information needed to understand the
big picture of which the pieces are spread among multiple RFCs.
To some extent, security-related problems are treated as “hot pota-
toes"; the responsibility of securing different aspects of MPLS-TP
in different RFCs is sometimes outsourced to another RFC some
of which are only informational and majority of which is without
straightforward guidelines. Consequently, the lack of holistic ap-
proach in securing the MPLS-TP network makes the whole process
difficult to follow. For example, RFC 5085 [12] relies on IPsec to
provide the security of MPLS-TP, but this is not always applicable
as there are some non IP flows in some smart grid and other con-
texts that use MPLS-TP. This led us to pose as a hypothesis that
vendor solutions might not correctly implement all of the required
security. To test this hypothesis, we started an analysis of several
MPLS-TP implementations. In this paper, we report on our find-
ings with the Cisco IOS implementation, Cisco being one of the
leading manufacturers of network equipment and with a large in-
vestment in smart grids.
In Section 2, we give an overview of the MPLS-TP features that
are necessary to understand the experiments we conduct. In Section
3 we describe the testbed, that we build in the lab environment: it
consists of eight virtual routers that each runs a Cisco IOS image
that supports MPLS-TP.
In Section 4, we describe how we were able to conduct the at-
tacks. This occurred in spite of us implementing the security guide-
lines that are available from Cisco for IOS and MPLS-TP (which
include IPSec and authentication of the control plane). In some
scenarios (not reported here) the available security measures were
sufficient, however, we identified other scenarios, described below,
where these security measures were not sufficient. In these latter
scenarios, the attacker harms the network at several points (e.g.,
disabling both working and protection LSPs) by using the access to
only one or two interfaces of a switch (e.g., on the protection LSP).
We achieved this by inserting forged BFD or PSC messages into the
network, which induces the label edge router (LER) into believing
false information about the LSP status. In two attacks, the LER
disables the operational LSP. In another attack, the LER continues
to believe that a physically destroyed LSP is up and running. These
spoofing attacks rely on the assumption that an attacker gains phys-
ical access to cables in the network. This assumption is consistent
with reality because it is common to find several unmanned facili-
ties, such as remote substations, in smart grid networks. Such sub-
stations are where fiber-to-copper converters or optical terminators
of an MPLS-TP network likely reside. Moreover, some smart grid
utilities also deploy pole-mounted optical repeaters at every few
kilometres along their electric transmission lines. Gaining physical
access to such physically exposed locations is usually as easy as
breaking a window in a substation or climbing up a pole.
In addition to the ease of physical access to the attack locations,
the equipment required to mount the spoofing attacks is rather af-
fordable. In MPLS-TP networks where only optical links are used
(no copper) an attacker can afford a NetFPGA-10G card [10] with
SFP+ modules in order to gain access to the network. Besides, it
is not uncommon to find copper cables between optical termination
nodes (fiber-to-copper converters) and MPLS-TP routers (see Fig-
ure 4). The cost of equipment required to launch a spoofing attack
in such networks is almost negligible. An attacker can utilize an
off-the-shelf switch to connect his laptop computer to the network
at the copper cable segments. The attacker only injects very mod-
est amounts of bogus traffic from his laptop computer and does not
need to intercept legitimate traffic, which remains untouched. As
such, our described attacks require only low-end, cheap equipment
that is readily available in all consumer electronics shops. In our
experiments, we used the second method to access the network in
order to demonstrate the spoofing attacks discussed in this paper.
Note that the nature of attacks remains the same no matter which
method of gaining access to the network is used.
In two of our attacks, the attacker needs to access only one ca-
ble; in another one, he needs access to two cables. In all cases, an
attacker gains more power to damage the physical electrical infras-
tructure as a result of a more intelligent communication network,
i.e., an attacker can now bring down a physical target in the power
grid from a remote location by selectively manipulating traffic at
only one, or in some cases two, locations in the communication
infrastructure. In conventional power grid networks, an attacker
would have required physical access to sabotage the target. If we
want to compare the attacks described in this paper to the one that
involves simple wire cutting, we can see that cutting wires harms
only LSPs directly affected by the cut whereas we show that our
attacks are more powerful (LSPs in the other parts of the network
are also affected). In some sense, this is in contradiction with the
expected benefits of smart grids: they should not make the electri-
cal systems weaker than they are today. In Section 5 we discuss
countermeasures that are likely to thwart the described attacks.
2. MPLS-TP PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
A label-switched path (LSP) is defined as a one-way path that
data follows from one particular node (a router able to do label-
switching) to a different node, where intermediate nodes can be
traversed. The two nodes where data enters and leaves the LSP
are called label edge routers (LER), and nodes traversed within the
LSP are called label-switching routers (LSR). MPLS-TP mandates
that all LSPs go by pairs traversing the same nodes and links on
each direction, and that they be signaled as a single entity (one
single LSP identifier is used); this characteristic is called co-routed
bidirectional.
In MPLS-TP, the control plane for signalling and recovering LSPs
can be static or dynamically configured. In smart grids, a static
configuration is commonly used by network operators for security
reasons, to avoid interacting with dynamic control protocols (i.e.,
RSVP-TE, T-LDP) from other service providers; as we are in the
context of smart-grid communication networks, we use static con-
figuration of MPLS-TP LSPs for our analysis.
Recovery is the ability of the network to become operational
following the failure or degradation of traffic delivery caused by
a network fault or a denial-of-service attack on the network [15].
There are several types of recovery methods in MPLS-TP, and in
our testbed we analyze protection switching. Protection switching
is a well-suited method that provides fast repair and exists side-by-
side with the static configuration of the control plane commonly
used in smart grids. This method pre-allocates an alternative bidi-
rectional LSP to divert traffic during a fault condition, uses BFD for
link failure detection with an almost immediate response time (i.e.,
less than 50ms) and has a mechanism for coordinating the state
of the protection provided to a working LSP between both LERs.
Within the protection switching scope, a working LSP is defined as
the LSP where data runs under normal operating conditions; fur-
thermore, a protection LSP is the pre-allocated LSP where data is
diverted from the working LSP in case of network failure or degra-
dation. The service delivered by both working and protection LSPs
is called an “MPLS-TP tunnel".
There are two different schemes for providing protection switch-
ing to an LSP. The first scheme is called “1+1", where the label
edge router at the ingress of the MPLS-TP tunnel transmits simul-
taneously the data on both working and protection LSPs, and the
label edge router at the egress of the MPLS-TP tunnel selects be-
tween working or protection LSPs based on some predetermined
criteria. The second scheme is called “1:n" where the working LSP
handles data under normal operating conditions; and only if there
is a defect, failure, degradation or request from network operator,
the traffic is switched to protection LSP. For simplicity, in this pa-
per we discuss a particular case of the second scheme called “1:1"
where one pre-allocated protection LSP serves one particular work-
ing LSP. The nature of the attacks we conduct is such that the secu-
rity weaknesses revealed in our testbed can be exploited in schemes
“1+1" and “1:n" as well, with exactly the same results.
 Ver Diag Sta|P|F|C|A|D|M Detect Mult Length 
My Discriminator 
Your Discriminator 
Desired Min TX Interval 
Required Min RX Interval 
Required Min Echo RX Interval 
Auth Type Auth Length Authentication Data 
Figure 1: Format of a BFD Control Packet.
2.1 Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
BFD in MPLS-TP is a protocol that detects link failures within
the MPLS-TP tunnel. From the three types of messages described
in [1], our focus is on the BFD control packet that we are spoofing
in our attack. The BFD control packet verifies the continuity of
an LSP. A BFD session is established between label edge routers
for each LSP within the MPLS-TP tunnel. A LER sends a BFD
control packet every 3.3 ms (this is the interval recommended by
IETF [15]); the BFD control packet is sent in-band in the LSP (i.e.
is switched at intermediate routers exactly like data packets in the
LSP) and is intercepted by the LER that terminates the LSP. When
an LER observes that 3 consecutive BFD control packets are not
received, it declares the incoming LSP to be broken; as the two
directions of co-routed bidirectional LSPs can fail independently,
the receiving LER sends a BFD “Session Down" message in the
reverse direction of the LSP to inform the LER at the other end
of the failure; then protection switching is triggered. In Cisco’s
implementation BFD control packets are sent every 4 ms instead of
3.3 ms.
In order to understand the attacks described in section 4, we in-
clude the format of a BFD control packet in Figure 1 and provide
relevant information for the fields concerning our attacks. The first
of two fields for our testbed is the diagnostics (Diag) field, which is
five bits long and reports a fault or defect condition between label
edge routers; from the 32 possible codes we are interested in two
of them, a 0 means there is no fault or defect condition to report
and a code 1 stands for “Control Detection Timer Expired", which
in normal operating conditions is set when we miss three consecu-
tive BFD control packets. The second field is the state (Sta) field,
which is two bits long and refers to the state of the BFD session
between label edge routers; here a value of zero means “Adminis-
trative Down" (given by network operator), one stands for “Down",
two for “Init" (used during BFD session setup) and three for “Up".
2.2 Protection State Coordination (PSC)
The PSC protocol is used to ensure that — whenever protec-
tion switching is triggered in one of the unidirectional LSPs of
an MPLS-TP tunnel — the protection switching is also triggered
for the remaining unidirectional LSP. This is in line with the co-
routed bidirectional feature of MPLS-TP LSPs described in Section
2.1. PSC protocol also tells the LER whether the protection LSP is
available, and if there is any inconsistency in protection switching
configuration (timers, revertive functionality, etc.) between LERs.
There are six different PSC protocol states, among which the
normal state is the default state when protection switching is en-
abled; and the unavailable state, which is used when protection
switching is disabled by network operator or unavailable due to
a failure on the protection LSP. A label edge router calculates the
next PSC protocol state, based on the priorities of the requests is-
sued by three sources: local requests (which can come from the net-
work operator, control plane, management plane or specific timers),
the PSC message received from the peer label edge router, and the
Ver Request Prot. Type Revertive Reserved1 FPath Path 
TLV Length Reserved2 
Optional TLVs 
Figure 2: Format of a PSC Control Packet.
current PSC protocol state. According to [16], the highest prior-
ity of the requests issued by any of the sources described above
corresponds to network-operator commands (“Clear", “Lockout of
Protection" and “Forced Switch"). Network-operator commands
are used by the attackers to launch the attacks on the PSC protocol
described in Section 4.2. For these attacks, we discuss two fields
of the PSC control packet format (Figure 2). First we have the 4-
bit request (Request) field that represents the PSC protocol state of
the local label edge router that is sent to the peer label edge router
to be considered on its next state computation. In this field code
14 stands for “Lockout of Protection" and indicates that protection
switching is down as a result of a network operator command. The
second field is the 8-bit fault path (FPath) field that indicates which
LSP (working or protection) shall be affected by the Request field.
3. TESTBED DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe the setting we used to evaluate MPLS-
TP security. The network topology that we used is shown in Figure
3 [4]. Depicted routers run Cisco IOS that supports MPLS-TP;
namely, we use Cisco Cloud Service router 1000V (CSR1000V)
IOS. We mount eight VMWare virtual machines (VM) configured
with CSR 1000V images on two physical machines (four virtual
routers per each of the two physical machines). Each physical ma-
chine has an eight-core processor and 16GB of RAM. We assign
one processor core and 3GB of RAM for each of the four virtual
routers within one physical machine. The CSR 1000V 60-day eval-
uation license that we had at our disposal gave us full access to all
the CSR 1000V features at a throughput of 50 Mbps. To the best of
our knowledge, Cisco’s other commercially available routers that
support MPLS-TP have no additional security-related features.
We configure our MPLS-TP network to follow a one-to-one (1:1)
protection mechanism by configuring a working LSP and a protec-
tion LSP between R2 and R7. A working LSP follows the path
R2-R1-R3-R5-R7, whereas a protection LSP follows the path R2-
R4-R6-R8-R7. We configure LSPs statically and use RSVP to re-
serve network resources. In order to connect each virtual router, as
well as two physical machines, we use 1 Gbps links with full du-
plex configuration. As MPLS TP recommends co-routed bidirec-
tional LSPs as described in Section 2, both directions of each link
are assigned 25Mbps of bandwidth. Inside both the working and
protection LSPs, we configure a BFD session, described in Section
2.1, with a 4ms message interval and a 12ms detection interval [5].
R1 R3 R5 R7
R2 R4 R6 R8
Working LSP
Protection LSP
LSR LSR LSR
LSRLSR LSRLER
LER
Figure 3: The Network topology with 1:1 Protection used in
our MPLS-TP testbed.
R3 R5 R7
R2 R4 R6 R8
Working Path
Protection Path
LSR LSR
LSRLSR LSRLER
LER
PC
R1
LSR
Switch Inserted
R3 R5
E/O O/EEthernet
Fiber Ethernet
a
c
d
b
LSR LSR
Figure 4: BFD Spoofing Attack : Removing protection from a
target LSP.
4. VULNERABILITIES IN MPLS-TP PRO-
TOCOL
In this section, we describe three attacks. In Section 4.1 we de-
scribe two BFD spoofing attacks: In the first one, we remove pro-
tection from a target LSP; and in the second one, we disable fault
detection in an LSP. In Section 4.2 we describe a PSC spoofing at-
tack in which we bring down an operational MPLS-TP tunnel. As
discussed in Section 1, we assume that the attacker can access the
cables at one point (for the first and third attacks) or two points (for
the second attack).
4.1 BFD Spoofing Attacks
As described in Section 2.1, BFD control messages are used to
proactively monitor the continuity of an LSP. In this section, we de-
scribe spoofing attacks associated with BFD messages that enable
an attacker to launch targeted attacks on a specific LSP.
4.1.1 Scenario I - Removing Protection from a Tar-
get LSP
In this attack, the attacker’s goal is to falsely inform a label edge
router that a working LSP is broken, even though there is no actual
failure. This attack forces label edge routers of an LSP to unneces-
sarily switch from a working LSP to a protection LSP.
In our experiment, first we connected our switch to the cable of
the working LSP at point a in Figure 4. Then we connected our lap-
top b to the switch and sniffed for BFD packets in order to gather
information such as MAC addresses of LSRs R3 and R5, MPLS
label, the TTL value, and the BFD session number of the target
LSP between LERs R2 and R7. Finally, using the sniffed informa-
tion, we created the forged packets by using the Scapy [13] tool and
sent them to R7 through the switch by using a simple python code.
The packets were manipulated such that we modified the Diagnos-
tic (Diag) field and the State (Sta) field of a BFD control packet
shown in Figure 1; the Diag field was set to “Control Detection
Time Expired" and the Sta to “Down" (Figure 5). Note that other
Diag field codes could also be used with similar results.
Figure 5: A wireshark capture of a spoofed BFD packet to re-
move protection from a target LSP.
Upon reception of BFD Down packets, R7 is deceived into be-
lieving that the forward working LSP from R2 to R7 is down. In
order to observe the result of this attack, we sniffed at points c and
d of Figure 41; we observed that R7 starts the protection switching
by sending to R2 three PSC packets via the protection LSP with a
“Signal Fail (SF)" message, and by sending BFD control packets
via the working LSP with the Sta field set to “Down". R7 does this
despite the fact that it also receives legitimate BFD packets from
R2 with Sta field set to “Up". When R2 receives the BFD and PSC
messages from R7 through the working LSP and protection LSP
(respectively), it triggers the protection switching and sends to R7
three PSC control packets with a “Signal Fail (SF)" message.
We observed that, by continuously injecting the forged BFD Down
packets destined to R7, we impede the working LSP from getting
back on feet - effectively removing protection from the target LSP.
This is possible because there is no mechanism for detecting that
the frequency with which the messages are coming is different from
what is expected. In other words, no matter how many forged mes-
sages we insert within the expected period of 4ms, it does not raise
any suspicion and those messages are accepted as legitimate. Sim-
ilarly, no suspicion is raised when a node receives a steady mixture
of “Up" and “Down" messages. As a final outcome of the attack, in
the case of a fault in the protection LSP, the LERs would not have
any alternative LSP to switch to.
4.1.2 Scenario II - Disabling LSP Fault Detection
The attacker’s goal in this attack is the inverse of the attack in-
troduced above, i.e., he aims to falsely inform label edge routers
that a working LSP is up and running, while in reality it is down
due to a link failure somewhere along the path. The link failure
can be due to deliberate sabotage or a result of a random failure. In
our experiment, we used the set up in Figure 6 to demonstrate this
attack. On the working LSP, we connected two malicious switches
b and d to the cables between R1 and R2 and between R5 and R7.
Then we connected two laptops a and c to the MPLS-TP network
through these two switches.
R3 R5 R7
R2 R4 R6 R8
LSR LSR
LSRLSR LSRLER
LER
PC
R1
LSR
Switch Inserted
d
c
PCa
b
Switch Inserted
Working Path
Protection Path
X
Link Failure
Figure 6: BFD Spoofing Attack: Disabling fault detection in an
LSP.
From laptop a, we injected forged BFD “Session Up" packets
(the Sta field set to “Up") destined to LER R2 as if they were sent
from LER R7. Likewise, we injected forged “Session Up" packets
from laptop c destined to LER R7 as if they were sent from LER
R2. The two LERs processed these forged packets without raising
any alarms in spite of receiving more BFD “Session Up" packets
than expected, as a result of the packets injected from our laptops.
We then silently broke the link between R1 and R3, thus emu-
lating a random link failure condition, while we continued sending
the forged “Session Up" BFD packets to both label edge routers
R2 and R7 from our two laptops. Again, we observed that the two
label edge routers R2 and R7 did not notice the change in the rate
1Note that packet sniffing at points c and d is not part of the attack,
we used it only to establish that the attack works.
Figure 7: A wireshark capture of a spoofed PSC message to
shutdown a working LSP
of received BFD “Session Up" messages as a result of the missing
authentic BFD messages from each other. Hence, the forged BFD
messages from our laptops tricked both label edge routers into be-
lieving that the working LSP was still up and running, while in real-
ity the link between R1 and R3 was down. To test our hypotheses,
we sent ping commands from R2 to R7 and sniffed for traffic in
the working LSP at laptop a. At this location, we observed ping
requests sent from R2 to R7. We also observed that R2 did not
receive any ping replies on either of its interfaces. Hence, we con-
clude that R2 actually sent the ping requests through the working
LSP as if everything was fine on this LSP.
The general conclusion we can make from this experiment is
that sending forged BFD “Session Up" packets to both LERs of an
LSP disables protection switching in the presence of a link failure.
Therefore, data sent through the working LSP from either end of
the LSP is silently dropped at the broken link. Such loss of data
can have undesirable consequences especially to real-time systems
such as smart-grid applications.
4.2 PSC Spoofing Attack
In this attack, the goal is to instruct a label edge router to com-
pletely shutdown a target MPLS-TP tunnel for particular working
and protection LSPs. Based on our testbed-experiment results, car-
rying out PSC spoofing attack is simpler compared to a BFD spoof-
ing attack due to the priority hierarchy of the protocol and to the
plainness of the requests for the change of the PSC protocol state,
as described in section 2.2; nevertheless, the results of the PSC
spoofing attack can be devastating compared to a BFD spoofing at-
tack because the PSC message can completely stop the operation
of a target MPLS-TP tunnel.
For the attack carried out in the testbed, we inserted a switch be-
tween routers R4 and R6, and we plugged a laptop to the switch, as
shown at points a and b in Figure 9. The only attributes we needed
to gather were the MAC address of the target label-switching router
(R6) and the MPLS label, as opposed to several attributes needed
for BFD spoofing attacks.
We created two different types of PSC packets; one targeting the
working LSP and another one targeting the protection LSP. Both
messages emulate an operator’s "shutdown" commands executed
at R2 for both the working and protection LSPs. We generate the
spoofed packets by manipulating the Request and the Fault Path
fields. For the PSC packet targeting the working LSP, we set the
Request field to “Forced switch (12)" and the Fault Path field to
“Working (1)" (Figure 7) and for the one targeting the protection
LSP the Request field is set to “‘Lockout of protection (14)" and
the Fault Path field to “Protection (0)" (Figure 8) . Finally, we sent
both packets to LER R7 via R6.
In order to observe the effectiveness of this attack, we setup a
sniffing session on both interfaces of routerR7 (point c of Figure 9)
(as before, such a sniffing session is not part of the attack, only part
of our observation). We observed that when R7 received the forged
PSC packet targeting the working LSP, it assumed LER (R2) was
Figure 8: A wireshark capture of a spoofed PSC message to
shutdown a protection LSP
instructed by a network operator to switchover to protection LSP.
As a result R7 also locked out the working LSP and sent three PSC
control packets back to R2 with the Request field set to "Forced
switch", Fault Path set to “Working". When R7 received the sec-
ond forged PSC packet that targeted the protection LSP, again R7
assumed that R2 was instructed by the network operator to lockout
the protection LSP. Thus it also locked out the protection LSP and
replied back to R2 with three PSC packet with Request field set to
"Lockout of protection (14)" and Fault Path to “Protection".
R3 R5 R7
R2 R4 R6 R8
Working Path
Protection Path
LSR LSR
LSRLSR LSRLER
LER
PC
R1
LSR
Switch Inserted
R4 R6
E/O O/EEthernet
Fiber Ethernet
a
c
bLSR LSR
Figure 9: Network setup for PSC Spoofing attack.
The consequence of the attack is a complete shutdown of the
MPLS-TP tunnel for the transmission of data. Since the forged
packets inserted during the attack have the structure of a network
operator’s command, the LERs cannot bring the MPLS-TP tunnel
up by themselves. Thus the network operator is required to explic-
itly issue command to bring back the MPLS-TP tunnel to normal
function.
5. DISCUSSION AND COUNTERMEASURES
In the previous section, we discussed spoofing attacks on BFD
and PSC messages. These attacks disrupt the proper operation of
an MPLS-TP network. Such attacks are possible because a label
edge router does not have a means to verify whether received BFD
and PSC messages truly originate from the label edge router on the
other end of an LSP or whether they were forged messages. There-
fore, an obvious solution to these attacks is to implement message-
origin authentication mechanisms.
RFC5880 [9] proposes an optional authentication scheme for
protecting BFD messages from spoofing attacks. Such a solution, if
implemented with a proper key management scheme, could prevent
the BFD spoofing attacks similar to those introduced in Section 4.1.
However, the Cisco IOS MPLS-TP implementation, which we used
for our experiments, does not implement this authentication option.
Unlike BFD, the PSC protocol does not have any built-in secu-
rity to protect it from spoofing attacks. One solution for protec-
tion against PSC messages spoofing attacks is to craft a built-in
authentication mechanism, similar to the optional BFD authentica-
tion (RFC5880), by using one of the optional TLV fields in a PSC
packet.
If an MPLS-TP core network supports IP services, OAM mes-
sages such as BFD and PSC messages can be tunnelled on top of
an IP tunnel. In such cases, standard IP security solutions such
as IPsec or (D)TLS between label edge routers can be used to
provide end-to-end security, thereby preventing spoofing attacks.
RFC5085 [12] proposes IPsec as a solution to protect OAM pro-
tocols of MPLS/GMPLS networks if the core network supports IP,
VPN, or transport services. However, not all core networks are re-
quired to support IP. For example, a smart grid MPLS-TP network
that transports IEC 61850 based Multicast Sampled Value (MSV)
and Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messages
between substations or between a substation and a controller is of-
ten implemented without IP [14].
An alternative solution for preventing spoofing attacks on BFD
and PSC messages in non-IP MPLS core networks is to use hop-by-
hop security (MACsec). However, Cisco does not support MACsec
in its routers. One minor drawback of using MACsec is that if any
of the network devices in an LSP are compromised, MACsec fails
to achieve its purpose, i.e., forged BFD and/or PSC packets injected
at the compromised device will be processed as valid packets by a
receiving label edge router. Nonetheless, such attacks can be pre-
vented by incorporating tamper resistant security solutions such as
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to protect sensitive data and by
enforcing proper access control mechanisms to deny unauthorised
access to the network devices. Note that implementing an ACL
alone would not solve the problem as the attack is conducted with
spoofed packets. Since our findings show that lack of MAC layer
security exposes smart grid networks to various cyber-attacks, we
recommend that utilities implement MACsec or a variant of it in
their MPLS-TP networks.
6. CONCLUSION
MPLS-TP is the proposed technology for WAN connectivity in
the context of smart grid. In this paper, we have shown that, when it
comes to the security aspects of the standard, there is a discrepancy
between RFCs and the Cisco IOS implementation for MPLS-TP we
evaluated, which is not surprising given the complexity of RFCs.
More specifically, we have observed that the Cisco IOS does not
implement security recommendations for OAM protocols, such as
BFD and PSC, thus exposing them to different spoofing attacks. In
our testbed, to launch spoofing attacks on these two OAM protocols
we exploited the identified security vulnerabilities. By launching
spoofing attacks, we have shown that we could degrade the perfor-
mance of an MPLS-TP network by removing a protection LSP of
an MPLS-TP tunnel. We have also demonstrated that we can dis-
able detection of a link failure in LSP by tricking label edge routers
into believing a failed link is still up and running. Finally we have
shown that we can bring the whole MPLS-TP tunnel down by send-
ing forged operator PSC commands.
Our experiments with the Cisco IOS show that no protection
against spoofing attacks is provided for non-IP MPLS-TP OAM
messages. Therefore, we recommend that RFCs be more direc-
tive in proposing built-in security for OAM protocols. They should
mandate source authentication mechanisms for both BFD and PSC
messages or mandate MACsec or a variant of it as an alternative
authentication solution when built-in security is absent.
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